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A GAME CHANGER FOR THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
INCENTIVES
Stephen Ellis,* Grant Hayden** & Cynthia Rogers***
State and local governments have embraced their authority to offer economic
development incentives for the purpose of attracting, retaining, or enhancing
economic activity within their borders. Collectively, these programs represent an
enormous, but largely overlooked, transfer of wealth from public entities to private
firms. The increasing use of economic development incentives runs counter to the
guidance offered by academic researchers. With their proliferation comes the
increasing need for accountability in the decision-making process. We consider
whether the duty of care standard used in corporate governance should be applied
to the public decision-making context regarding economic development incentives.

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 954
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES ............... 955
A. The Theory Behind Economic Incentives .................................................. 956
B. The Problems with Economic Development Incentives ............................. 957
II. CURRENT CHECKS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ACTION ................................. 963
A. Political Accountability and Its Limits ....................................................... 963
B. Market Accountability and Its (Current) Limits ......................................... 965
C. The Relationship Between Political and Market Accountability................ 967
III. PROPOSAL: MARKET ACCOUNTABILITY LITE ................................................. 968
A. The Duty of Care and Business Judgment Rule in Corporate Law ............ 969
B. Proposal: A Duty of Care for Local Governments ..................................... 973
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 975

*
Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma. B.A., M.A.
University of Kansas; Ph.D. Rutgers University.
**
Professor, Hofstra Law School. B.A., M.A. University of Kansas; J.D.
Stanford Law School.
***
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Oklahoma. B.A. Kent State
University; Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh.

954

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 56:4

INTRODUCTION
The recent Detroit bankruptcy has focused the public’s attention on the
perilous state of local government finances. To some degree, municipalities are at
the mercy of the larger economic tides and must brace themselves for the financial
implications of broader downturns. Local officials do, however, try to stem the
tides. In our system of fiscal federalism, state and local governments enjoy a
considerable degree of autonomy regarding their taxing and spending decisions.
Such fiscal autonomy allows them to offer economic development incentives for
the purpose of attracting, retaining, or enhancing economic activity within their
borders. This authority has not been neglected. The proliferation of development
incentives programs is notable due to the sheer number of programs available, the
number of firms receiving incentives, and the overall dollar value of incentives
that have been offered. At this point, the use of such incentives is endemic in local
government, resulting in the transfer of tens of billions of dollars every year from
public coffers to private firms.
The growth of incentive activity is related to the nature of the economic
development “game.” Policymakers seek to attract firms that are likely to generate
high net value for the community. Such firms, however, attract competition from
other jurisdictions. Competition drives up the value of the incentive offers. The
prospect of achieving a positive net benefit by offering incentives in this setting is
dubious. The academic literature points out numerous pitfalls associated with
incentive competition, mostly related to ignorance of costs and benefits. It is
possible to subsidize the wrong firm—firms that have low value or aren’t
influenced by the subsidy—or to oversubsidize the right firm. The empirical
evidence suggests that offering incentives, in general, does not work.
So why do policymakers persist in such a questionable practice? The
positive motives vary from case to case, but such behavior persists because the
political structures within which incentive offers are made provide decisionmakers with no real reason to look into their effectiveness—and some reason not
to look. Given the (mere) surface plausibility of the view that incentives are
effective, government officials have no cause to dig any deeper. We offer an
approach that counters the ignorance that characterizes current decision-making
regarding economic development incentives.
When communities try to attract firms, they behave like businesses trying
to attract customers. Economic development incentives serve as “rebates” that
reduce the “price” of what a community has to “sell.” Our proposal is based on this
symmetry. Private firms have a fiduciary duty of care to their shareholders; we
believe state and local governments—when they engage in the business-like
activity of attracting firms in order to improve economic conditions—owe a duty
of care to their citizens as well. The duty of care for private firms is sharply limited
by the business judgment rule: courts will not second-guess substantive economic
decisions, but will only enforce a procedural standard; firm decision-makers must
ask the right questions and look at the right sort of information. Likewise,
governmental decision-makers should be required to consider all relevant
information and issues before they make decisions about incentives.
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A procedural duty of care would serve to strengthen political constraints
on state and local policymakers. Concerned citizens would be enabled to determine
whether their elected officials had avoided the various difficulties of offering
incentives and, if not, they could try to rally other citizens to hold officials
responsible at the polls. Even just calling officials to their duties as good
community stewards might have a salutary effect on their decision-making. In the
end, we believe that if both of the parties negotiating over economic development
incentives—private corporations and local governments—are deemed to owe their
constituents a similar duty of care, they will engage in the kind of behaviors that
lead to better decision-making on such agreements.

I. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
INCENTIVES
Economic development incentives are widely used by states and localities
to encourage growth in their communities. Nearly every government unit at every
level offers some type of subsidy in an attempt to influence firm location
decisions.1 The most common incentives, according to national surveys conducted
by the International City/County Management Association (the professional
organization for municipal, city, town, township, and county managers), are those
that involve direct spending, such as investment in infrastructure, and those that
involve a diversion of tax revenues, such as tax abatements and tax increment
finance districts.2 Good Jobs First, a watchdog group, tracks the value of state and
local incentives; its database includes information on more than 249,000 subsidy
awards from 427 programs in all 50 states.3
Collectively, these programs involve enormous sums of money.
According to a recent series in The New York Times, local governments provide at
least 1,874 incentives programs worth over $80.4 billion each year. 4 More than

1.
See Mildred Warner & Lingwen Zheng, Economic Development Strategies
for Recessionary Times: Survey Results from 2009, in THE ICMA MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK
2011 33–42 (2011) (“In 2004, 72% of local governments used business incentives, but in
2009, 95% reported using them.”).
2.
See Laura A. Reese & Gary Sands, Trends in Local Economic Development:
Management, Conflict, and Ethics, in MANAGEMENT POLICIES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCE 319–42 (John R. Bartle et al. eds., 2012); Lingwen Zheng & Mildred Warner,
Business Incentive Use Among U.S. Local Governments: A Story of Accountability and
Policy Learning, 24 ECON. DEV. Q. 325 (2010). Tax increment finance districts provide a
funding mechanism by which revenues generated by new development in an area (typically
a blighted inner-city neighborhood) are spent on basic infrastructure improvements in the
designated area. The idea is that the investment will improve business activity over time.
3.
See
Subsidy
Tracker
2.0,
GOOD
JOBS
FIRST,
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/subsidy-tracker (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) (subsidy tracker).
Good Jobs First is a national policy resource center; its subsidy tracker site aggregates data
from public sources.
4.
Louise Story et al., Explore Government Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-incentives.html (last visited
May 8, 2013) (searchable database of state and local government subsidies); see also Louise
Story et al., United States of Subsidies: As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay
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5,000 companies received incentives worth $1 million or more, and 48 of those
companies have received more than $100 million worth of incentives since 2007.5
Somewhat surprisingly, these figures represent only a fraction of all incentives
offered: not only are many subsidy programs unreported, but many localities do
not know the value of the incentives they provide. 6 Thus, at least at their inception,
economic development incentives involve huge transfers of wealth from public
entities to private firms.
A. The Theory Behind Economic Incentives
Economic development incentives are not charitable contributions: state
and local governments expect a return on their investments. Proponents claim that
incentives lead to community economic prosperity by creating partnerships with
private firms.7 In this Article, we argue that each community, then, should think of
itself as something like a business that sells certain kinds of resources—
infrastructure, amenities, and access to markets—to private firms in return for jobs,
taxes, access to goods and services, and other benefits that attend economic
growth. Each party receives something of value from, and brings something of
value to, citizens (who are the “shareholders” of the community as well as the
consumers of the firm). Each party profits when it values what it gets more than
what it gives. It is vital to see that a locality’s profit doesn’t come at the expense of
its own customers—the firms for which it already provides services. As with any
other purchase, a private firm should make a deal with a community only if it sees
the product offered as worth the price charged. Not every locality is a fit for every
attractive firm; not every attractive firm is a fit for every locality. 8
Of course, private firms can, and often do, make decisions to locate or
expand facilities in particular places without any specially tailored arrangements
made by the relevant state and local governments. Incentive packages offered by
these governments amount to special offers, e.g., sales, rebates, upgrades, on what
those communities ordinarily provide. The point of such offers is to use relatively
High Price, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, at A1 [hereinafter Story et al., United States of
Subsidies].
5.
Story et al., Explore Government Subsidies, supra note 4.
6.
Story et al., United States of Subsidies, supra note 4.
7.
See, e.g., Larry Gigerich, Forging a Winning Business-Community
Partnership Through Incentives, AREA DEV. SITE & FACILITY P LAN., Spring 2013, at 58;
ARIZONA COMMERCE AUTHORITY, http://www.azcommerce.com/about-us (last visited Aug.
17, 2014) (“The Arizona Commerce Authority (ACA) is the leading economic development
organization with a streamlined mission to grow and strengthen Arizona’s economy. The
ACA uses a three-pronged approach to advance the overall economy: recruit, grow,
create—recruit out-of-state companies to expand their operations in Arizona; work with
existing companies to grow their business in Arizona and beyond; and partner with
entrepreneurs and companies large and small to create new jobs and businesses in targeted
industries.”).
8.
Consider, for example, the case of Vertex Pharmaceuticals, which has “has
failed to create the 500 net new jobs through 2015 that it promised in order to qualify for up
to $72 million in state and local subsidies.” Jeff Jacoby, The Bitter Pill of Failed State Tax
Incentives, TOWNHALL.COM (Nov. 6, 2013), http://townhall.com/columnists/jeffjacoby/2013
/11/06/the-bitter-pill-of-failed-state-tax-incentives-n1740094/page/full.
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small expenditures to leverage larger returns: there is no point in giving a private
firm a little extra income if all it will do is spend a bit more on inputs to produce
just a bit more output for the locality to tax. At best, this is a waste of effort: the
locality would do better to spend the money itself and avoid giving the firm a
share. (At worst, of course, the locality could lose the whole expenditure.) The
ability of communities to identify cases where a small incentive would have a
large effect on a firm’s trajectory is a crucial issue in determining whether an
incentives policy will be successful. Again, the goal of economic development
incentives is to induce business behavior that will pay off for the community. It is
vital, then, not to confuse sales volume—the number of firms that do business in a
community—with profit. Any business could increase its customer base by selling
below its costs, but no business could make a profit that way. A policy of making
unprofitable deals with new firms would lead a community to hurt both its
shareholders—local citizens—and its current customers—existing firms.
B. The Problems with Economic Development Incentives
Despite their widespread use, the efficacy of economic development
incentives has not been substantiated. The academic literature on incentives is
massive and growing. Fortunately, there are a number of articles that summarize
and review the state of the research. We will start by summarizing the results of
statistical analyses of aggregate empirical data, and then move on to examine the
reasons behind those results, including data issues, estimation difficulties,
methodological flaws, and limitations of generalizing from case study analyses.
Consider first the effect of incentives on firm behavior. A few different
scholars have provided summaries of the key articles in this literature. Alan Peters
and Peter Fisher described the consensus that has evolved from the early 1960s
through 2002 as follows: “There are very good reasons—theoretical, empirical,
and practical—to believe that economic development incentives have little or no
impact on firm location and investment decisions.” 9 Dan Gorin reviewed more
recent studies—ones that use better data and more sophisticated empirical
methods—and concluded that, while the extent to which incentives induce new
investment remains unknown, there are several fundamental reasons to doubt their
value.10 Carlianne Patrick provides the most up to date summary of the literature,
noting that evidence regarding the impact of incentives on location decisions is
ambiguous but unpromising—small, insignificant, and negative effects have been
documented. 11 Thus, the weight of the evidence suggests that economic
development incentives have little impact on the firm decisions they are designed
to influence.

9.
See Alan Peters & Peter Fisher, The Failures of Economic Development
Incentives, 70 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 27, 32 (2004).
10.
See Dan Gorin, Economic Development Incentives: Research Approaches
and Current Views, 93 FED. RES. BULL. 69 (2009).
11.
Carlianne Elizabeth Patrick, Essays in Growth and Development Policy 4
(2012)
(unpublished
Ph.D.
Dissertation,
The
Ohio
State
University)
(https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1343152438&disposition=inline).

958

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 56:4

If economic incentives do not influence firm behavior to any great extent,
then it stands to reason that incentives are unlikely to produce anticipated
beneficial economic outcomes. This conclusion is supported by the research
investigating the impact of incentives on economic development outcomes such as
net job, investment, and income growth. In her research, Patrick considers the
evidence of the most prominent empirical studies and concludes that there is no
support for a positive impact. 12 The fiscal impact of offering incentives on
communities has also been investigated. A positive effect has not been established:
offering incentives is associated with either no fiscal impact or fiscal
deterioration.13
Empirical investigations of incentives programs are difficult on many
levels, but none of the problems would suggest that these studies underrate
positive results. For example, one obvious issue is the lack of reliable data about
costs, especially where projects involve public spending on infrastructure, tax
expenditures, or property tax abatements. Costs that do not appear on any balance
sheet are difficult to include in research. 14 A second concern is separating the
effects of policy variables from other factors. Outcome variables may be driven by
nonincentive policies or events that occur at the same time as incentives programs.
This makes it difficult to determine what is leading to observed outcomes. Positive
outcomes may be mistakenly attributed to incentive policies. Even the most
sophisticated statistical methods can suffer from this sort of omitted variable
problem.15
To summarize, the empirical research does not provide evidence that
development incentives serve as engines of growth for communities. This doesn’t
mean that every possible incentives deal is doomed to fail, or that each actual
incentives program has, in fact, failed. It does strongly suggest, however, that
failure is common and, in particular, much more common than success. Thus, there
are compelling reasons to think that, in general, economic development incentives
do not work to induce business behavior that will pay off—in terms of jobs, sales,
and ultimately tax revenues—for the community that offers them.
All of the foregoing raises concerns about who pays for, and who benefits
from, economic development incentives. To the extent that incentives fail to
produce net economic gains for a community, existing residents wind up paying
for benefits (in the form of subsidies) that accrue to new firms (and, of course,
their investors). In the final analysis, such incentives appear to be wasteful
spending that either increases the tax burden or crowds out expenditures for public

12.
See id. at 34.
13.
See Gorin, supra note 10; see generally LEGISLATIVE DIVISION OF POST
AUDIT, STATE OF KANSAS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: DETERMINING THE AMOUNTS THE
STATE HAS SPENT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON
KANSAS COUNTIES 29–31 (2008).
14.
See Story et al., United States of Subsidies, supra note 4; see generally
LEGISLATIVE DIVISION OF POST AUDIT, supra note 13.
15.
Econometrics textbooks discuss omitted variables problems as a fundamental
problem in empirical research. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY
ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006).
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goods that people want, such as infrastructure and education. (If you spend money
on one thing, you can’t spend it on something else; if you still want to buy the
latter thing, you will need to raise other funds.)16
The evidence about economic development incentives programs strikes
many as surprising—offering subsidies to induce favorable behavior makes
intuitive sense. Unfortunately, this is one of those areas where intuitions mislead,
analogous to famous optical illusions such as the Muller–Lyer,17 the Ebbinghaus,18
and the Café Wall illusions.19 Just as mistaken visual perceptions persist even after
measurements are taken, intuitive judgments about the efficacy of incentives seem
to persist even in the face of the sorts of empirical evidence we cite above. 20 To
escape being misled by the pull of either visual illusions or economic development
incentives, it helps to keep referring to the empirical evidence to keep it firmly in
mind.
The practice of offering economic development incentives is fraught with
difficulty. A community that adopts standard incentives policies will almost
certainly fail to achieve its economic development goals. In order to do better, it
must, at a minimum, educate itself about the common pitfalls of such policies and,
in turn, adopt strategies to avoid them. There are basically three problems for a
local government to avoid: (1) giving money to firms for doing what they would
have done anyway; (2) eroding the net benefit of an incentive by competing with
other localities for a firm; and, (3) failing to fully count the costs of attracting a
firm and so suffering the “winner’s curse.”
The first major pitfall occurs when states and localities decide to
subsidize the wrong firms. To assess the profitability of an incentives offer, a
locality must compare what will happen if it makes a particular incentive offer
with what will happen if it does not. Suppose, for example, that a locality offers a
subsidy to get a firm to expand a plant: the locality doesn’t gain anything at all if
the firm was going to expand the plant anyway, it just loses the incentive. To
16.
See Gorin, supra note 10.
17.
The Muller–Lyer illusion involves a pair of equal length line segments, one
of which has stylized “arrowheads” pointing in at each end and one of which has stylized
“arrowheads” pointing out. The line segment with the inward pointing “arrowheads”
appears longer than the one with outward pointing “arrowheads.” Muller-Lyer Illusion,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCller-Lyer_illusion (last modified Oct.
9, 2014).
18.
“[T]wo circles of identical size are placed near to each other, and one is
surrounded by large circles while the other is surrounded by small circles. . . . [T]he central
circle surrounded by large circles appears smaller than the central circle surrounded by
small circles.” Ebbinghaus Illusion, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ebbinghaus
_illusion (last modified Oct. 14, 2014).
19.
“The café wall illusion is a geometrical-optical illusion in which the parallel
straight dividing lines between staggered rows with alternating black and white ‘bricks’
appear to be sloped.” Café Wall Illusion, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caf%C3
%A9_wall_illusion (last modified Oct. 9, 2014).
20.
On the persistence of visual illusions, see Optical Illusion, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optical_illusion (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). The persistence of
intuitions about the efficacy of incentives is based on the personal experience of authors
Ellis and Rogers in talking with other academics and local policymakers.
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leverage public money, a locality must catch a firm at a critical junction where a
small inducement can tip a decision—e.g., where a firm is indifferent among
expansion possibilities. As we note above, one reason why development incentives
fail to pay off is that communities make deals that do not actually influence firm
behavior. A firm might, for example, be attracted to a particular community
precisely because the local economy was already growing at a healthy rate. No
incentives would therefore be needed. The impact of an incentive should be
measured as the deviation from the community’s predicted growth trend, not the
level of growth.
From a decision-theoretic perspective, the elusiveness of the “but for”
question raises serious information issues. Economic fundamentals rarely leave
firms in equipoise, so they are rarely at the relevant crucial junctures. More
importantly, whether a firm is at such a decision point is proprietary information
that it has strategic reasons not to disclose. In addition to the downside risk of
competitors finding out, a firm might be able to get a subsidy for doing what it
would have done anyway.21
The risk of subsidizing the wrong firms is greatly exacerbated by human
psychology. In general, local policymakers want to be helpful to potential partners
and empathize with business representatives (they often run businesses
themselves). This pro-business bias is particularly evident in the economic
development realm. Herbert Rubin, after conducting a series of open-ended
interviews with economic development practitioners, discovered that:
Whether we are talking about small accommodations or massive
relocations for industrial development, the tilt seems to be
toward the business community. It is through the day-in-day-out
relationship that emerges as the practitioner tries to survive in a
difficult work environment, that the public sector’s bias toward
business needs is increased. A set of business demands (or
requests) becomes a checklist that changes an undefinable task
into one with a set of concrete sequential steps. 22
Under such circumstances, policymakers find it hard to view targeted firms as
having adversarial interests. Humans are influenced by the views of others in
social situations. 23 This is largely independent of the evidence offered for those

21.
Economists do have methods to address this issue. These methods, however,
are very “data hungry.” Quasi-experimental methods, for example, require reliable data for
the communities that were “treated” with the incentives program as well as comparable data
for communities that did not give incentives. See James J. Heckman et al., Matching As An
Econometric Evaluation Estimator, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 261 (1998). Sophisticated
statistical models often rely on the ability to get data at the community level over multiple
years. Such panel data on incentives values and outcome measures, however, are not readily
available.
22.
Herbert J. Rubin, Shoot Anything that Flies; Claim Anything that Falls, 2
ECON. DEV. Q. 236, 249 (1988). See also Harold Wolman & David Spitzley, The Politics of
Local Economic Development, 10 ECON. DEV. Q. 115, 138–40 (1996).
23.
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 53–71 (2008).
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views; what matters is the coherence of the story being told. 24 People are highly
susceptible to one-sided interpretations—spin, as the pundits would say—even
when they recognize it as such.25
A second common pitfall involves competing with other localities for a
firm. When a firm really is at a tipping point, a juncture where incentives can
change its behavior, it has reason to advertise that fact so that many localities will
compete for it. This creates a serious game-theoretic problem: competition among
localities leads to a “bidding war” where the incentives offers eat up the whole
advantage of attracting a firm in the first place.26
Again, the competition problem is exacerbated by human psychology. In
the first place, humans, particularly entrepreneurs, have a strong tendency to
neglect the strategic element of their decisions. They focus on their own plans and
skills, and not the equally-relevant-to-the-outcome plans and skills of their
opponent. 27 This sort of competition neglect leads to overconfidence, overcommitment, and poor outcomes. 28 More speculatively, people want to win when
they compete for anything. This increases the likelihood that local decision-makers
will emphasize “winning” the firm rather than focusing on the quality of the deal
itself. This dynamic, where the fact of competition undermines the point of the
competition, is familiar from everything from little league sports to cheating
scandals. This is a species of the more general tendency to substitute easier
questions for harder ones.29
These first two pitfalls of economic development incentives interact in a
particularly negative way. Even a firm with established plans, one that shouldn’t
be subsidized, will want to get communities involved in a bidding war. Such a
competition would drive up the cost of the first pitfall. Together, the first two
pitfalls form something of a dilemma: some firms aren’t worth subsidizing, so it is
a mistake to offer them incentives; and firms that it would be worthwhile to attract
are likely to draw competition, which ultimately will bleed away the (net) benefit
of offering them incentives in the first place. This dilemma is not inevitable, but it
does describe a pattern that often undermines the case for offering incentives.
The third pitfall involves neglecting the costs of incentives (and economic
development more generally), which leads to the “winner’s curse.” Even if a
locality manages to influence a firm to change its behavior without sparking a
bidding war, it doesn’t follow that a good deal has been made. The cost of altering
behavior may exceed the benefit. There is no uncertainty that assessing the value
of a development incentive requires comprehensive accounting of the expected
direct and indirect costs as well as the benefits. Unfortunately, as we saw before,
assessing the effectiveness of development incentives programs is notoriously
24.
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 87 (2011).
25.
See generally Lyle A. Brenner et al., On the Evaluation of One-Sided
Evidence, 9 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 59 (1996).
26.
See Stephen Ellis & Cynthia Rogers, Local Economic Development as a
Prisoners’ Dilemma: The Role of Business Climate, 30 REV. REG. STUD. 315 (2000).
27.
See KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 259–61.
28.
See id.
29.
See id. at 97–104.
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complex 30 and it may be beyond the capacity of many local governments.
According to a Pew Center on the States analysis, only 13 states have systems in
place to rigorously analyze economic development incentives programs so as to
inform policy. 31 Local governments are even less inclined to investigate the
effectiveness of development incentives programs ex post. Accounting for the
opportunity costs of extending a particular subsidy to a particular firm is related to
the counterfactual question in the first pitfall. It is difficult to put a value on what
the community gave up: was it an amenity, or were overall taxes higher than they
would have otherwise been? Here is where both lack of data and ex post analysis
are big problems.
Unfortunately, human psychology includes a tendency to lose track of the
full costs of actions.32 In the abstract, it is easy to see that revenue isn’t the same
thing as profit (profit equals revenues minus costs); in practice, however, the
distinction can get lost. This is especially likely where analysts use economic
impact analyses of the usual sort. These simple multiplier models 33 provide some
evidence about the (gross) benefits to expect from a proposed project, e.g., tax
revenues.34 What states and localities need to look at, however, are costs as well as
benefits. This sort of calculation is the distinctive feature of a fiscal impact
analysis. 35 Only a fiscal impact analysis, then, looks at development from the
perspective of the community-as-business.36 Even when a community does a fiscal
impact analysis, however, it is important to realize that costs aren’t necessarily
linear with scale (as fiscal impact models usually assume). There can be certain
startup costs regardless of the size of an incentives deal, and cost thresholds can be
passed as deals get larger, e.g., the need for a new school or the fact that newer
developments can be more expensive than average because of distance or
constraints imposed by existing amenities.
Again, there is a great deal of negative interaction among all of these
pitfalls. The real benefits of a deal are often overstated because of the first two
pitfalls. The real costs of proposals are underestimated because of the third.

30.
See Jonathan Q. Morgan, Analyzing the Benefits and Costs of Economic
Development Projects, CMTY. & ECON. DEV. BULL., Apr. 2010, at 6.
31.
See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE PEW CHARITABLE TR., EVIDENCE COUNTS:
EVALUATING STATE TAX INCENTIVES FOR JOBS AND GROWTH (2012) [hereinafter PEW CTR.].
32.
See Stephen Ellis, Market Hegemony and Economic Theory, 38 PHIL. SOC.
SCI. 513 (2008); Grant Hayden & Stephen Ellis, Law and Economics After Behavioral
Economics, 55 KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007).
33.
For example, IMPLAN (IMpact analysis for PLANning) or REMI (Regional
Economic Model Incorporated) models.
34.
In such models, a vector of economically relevant inputs is multiplied by a
matrix that is supposed to represent the effects of economic processes to output another
vector of economic predictions. Such models are pretty simplistic but they do suggest the
direction and rough magnitude of (gross) economic impact. See Morgan, supra note 30, at
3–5.
35.
Using, for example, LOCI (LOCal economic Impact model) or FIT (Fiscal
Impact Tool) models.
36.
See Carlieanne Patrick Crotty, Fiscal Impact Analysis Creates a Win-Win for
Projects and Communities, ECON. DEV. AM., Spring 2007, at 7.
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The foregoing considerations suggest at least three necessary conditions
for doing reasonable economic development incentives:
(1) Good information about economic counterfactuals, to avoid

subsidizing the wrong firms;
(2) Propitious circumstances that are unlikely to spark a “bidding
war” for a firm;
(3) A full accounting of costs, not only of the incentives
themselves, but also of the project being promoted.
Best practice requires using the appropriate analytic tools to determine that these
conditions are being met before proposing incentives. It is important to note that
looking at these conditions precedes but does not preclude the standard
considerations about making deals stick once it is determined that they are
worthwhile. That is, local governments should structure their contracts in ways
that tie incentives to performance and specify clawback provisions in case
outcomes are overstated. But they should also take great care in obtaining
information about likely outcomes up front, including honest assessments of
possible costs, before extending economic incentives in any particular case.
The fact that economic development incentives rarely work is generally
unrecognized, so it is no surprise that the reasons why they fail go unappreciated.
There is no need to postulate ill will in order to explain why: none of the primary
decision-makers has a structural incentive to become better educated about the
pitfalls of incentives. Firm managers are receiving something they want from
people who are giving it voluntarily—not much reason to look too closely at that
“gift horse.” Local officials think they are actually attracting firms and can seek
political rewards for doing so—they have no obvious reason to “rock the boat.”
Most citizens of communities don’t know what they don’t know about incentives.
It only takes a few vocal advocates of economic incentives, then, to give this lowinformation equilibrium a measure of stability. Economic incentives appear to be
win–win situations and so they continue to be offered.37

II. CURRENT CHECKS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
This Part discusses two forms of accountability that local governments
face in decision-making. Political accountability stems from the democratic
process via local elections. Market-style accountability arises via the ability of
individuals to sue the government for damages or violations of state or federal law.
As we discuss below, these two forms of accountability are related.
A. Political Accountability and Its Limits
Local governments are primarily accountable for their actions through the
election process. In order for this mechanism to work effectively, however, there
needs to be public access to governmental information and decision-making. There
also need to be adequate protections of the electorate’s voting rights. At this point,

37.
Margaret E. Dewar, Why State and Local Economic Development Programs
Cause So Little Economic Development, 12 ECON. DEV. Q. 68 (1998).
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every state provides public access to governmental information through its
freedom of information or public access laws. 38 Most states also have open
meeting, or “Sunshine Laws,” that, with a few exceptions, require local
governments to take action in meetings that are open to the public. 39 Most federal
and state protections of the right to vote extend to the election of members of local
governmental entities that exercise general governmental powers. 40 On the face of
it, then, elections would seem to provide a straightforward check on poor
governmental decision-making—the public knows what local officials are doing
and is empowered, when necessary, to “throw the bums out.”
In practice, however, the mechanism of political accountability is a bit
more complicated. No political system is perfectly responsive to the will of the
electorate (nor should it be). There are many reasons why elected officials may not
pay a political price for even manifestly awful decisions. Elections are only held
every few years, and campaigns to recall elected officials are usually quite difficult
to mount, much less win.41 The electorate’s memory fades. Sometimes, the poor
decisions are too insignificant or poorly understood to really pose a threat to an
incumbent’s chances at reelection. As Harold Wolman and David Spitzley note,
“[T]he costs of many of the standard local economic development activities are
relatively invisible.” 42 And even when important information exists, it may not
come to the attention of the voting public. A competitive political environment or a
robust local media would be a necessary condition for public oversight, but even
that might not be sufficient. There is some evidence that local officials try to
diminish public participation in local economic policy decisions. 43 At a minimum,
they tell a “public story” that tries to preserve electoral support.44 The reality of

38.
See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a
Post-Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 580, n.115 (2011) (listing state
statutes).
39.
See id. at 580–81, n.114 (listing state statutes); see also ANN TAYLOR
SCHWING, OPEN MEETING LAWS § 1.1 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing the genesis and purpose of
open meetings laws). This treatise, as its title implies, provides a comprehensive survey and
classification of the open meetings laws in all 50 states. Negotiations over economic
development incentives, however, are often exempted from state sunshine laws. See Aimee
Edmondson & Charles N. Davis, “Prisoners” of Private Industry: Economic Development
and State Sunshine Laws, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 317, 323–27 (2011).
40.
See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)
(applying constitutional guarantee of right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause to local
governments); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (applying constitutional
guarantee of equally weighted voting under the Equal Protection Clause to local
governments); Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012) (applying the act’s guarantees to
states and political subdivisions).
41.
See Timothy Pack, Comment, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Removing
Public Officials from Office in Utah and the Case for Recall, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 665, 678–
80 (detailing recall laws in many states and describing some of the hurdles involved in
mounting a recall).
42.
Harold Wolman & David Spitzley, The Politics of Local Economic
Development, 10 ECON. DEV. Q. 131 (1996).
43.
Id. at 143–45.
44.
See Dewar, supra note 37.
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local government is that many decisions may fly beneath the radar of the electorate
and never really factor into the probability of an incumbent’s reelection.
In the context of decisions to extend economic development incentives,
the problem may even be worse. As detailed above, the success or failure of a
particular incentive grant may not be fully realized for years, or even decades,
from the initial decision to grant it, and there’s very often no requirement to study
the ultimate effects of the grant. More important, freedom of information laws only
require local governments to disclose information they possess; they do not force
governments to generate any new information. 45 One of the principal problems
with decisions regarding development incentives is that they are made on the basis
of very little evidence or ordinary due diligence on the part of elected officials.
Again, the knowledge needed to avoid the pitfalls of incentives policies is seldom
readily available, even to the localities that offer incentives. Special analysis is
needed for each incentive offer. The information that is crucial to political
accountability often simply does not exist.
B. Market Accountability and Its (Current) Limits
In addition to being responsive to electoral pressure, government actors
may also be subject to a sort of market discipline through the imposition of
liability for wrongful actions. This was not always the case. Under the traditional
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the king could do no wrong. 46 That doctrine
largely survives and provides that governments and officers acting on their behalf
cannot commit legal wrongs and thus are not subject to civil or criminal liability
for their actions.47 This baseline of broad governmental immunity, however, has
been limited in cases where a governmental entity consents to be subject to
liability for certain kinds of actions or where a superior governmental entity
abrogates the immunity. The federal government, for example, has consented to be
sued for many ordinary torts in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 48 and has abrogated
state sovereign immunity with respect to certain actions by state officials in
violation of federal law in § 1983 lawsuits.49 And while state law varies widely,
most states have also consented to be sued in certain situations, mainly when they
act in roles that are more proprietary than governmental. 50
Local governments, however, are another matter. They are not typically
viewed as sovereigns in the same way as the federal and state governments, but,
rather, as legal “persons” that are a creation of state government.51 Their potential
liability for wrongful actions is entirely up to federal and state law. And while the
45.
46.

See Lee Levine et al., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 12.02 (4th ed. 2013).
See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *254; see also SANDRA M.
STEVENSON, UNDERSTANDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 9.1 (2d ed. 2009).
47.
See Aaron Tang, Double Immunity, 65 STAN. L. REV. 279, 285–92 (2013);
Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L.
REV. 439, 446 (2005).
48.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2012).
49.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
50.
See STEVENSON, supra note 46, at § 9.2.
51.
See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(holding that local government was a person for the purposes of § 1983).
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law originally saw a clear divide between ordinary corporations and municipal
corporations when it came to the issue of liability, that divide began to break down
over the last half century. Local governments, and their officials, are subject to
liability in a wide range of circumstances.
The main source of local government liability under federal law is
§ 1983.52 This statute provides a mechanism by which persons operating under the
color of state law may be held responsible for actions that violated the U.S.
Constitution or other federal law.53 While a state is not considered a “person,” for
the purposes of § 1983,54 local governments are persons and hence may be subject
to suit for damages and prospective relief under the statute. 55 Thus, local
governments may be sued directly for damages and prospective relief from local
laws and regulations that violate federal law. 56 If, for example, a city council
passes an ordinance that restricts the free speech of its citizens in violation of the
First Amendment, affected citizens may sue to recover damages caused by the
ordinance as well as to declare it unconstitutional and prohibit its enforcement.
While local governments are directly responsible in this way, the officials who
pass or administer the law are entitled to absolute or qualified immunity in actions
for damages depending upon the nature of the function they serve. Legislators, for
example, are typically entitled to absolute immunity; 57 subordinate, non-elected
officials, such as police officers, are only entitled to qualified immunity, meaning
that they are shielded from liability unless their actions violate “clearly
established” federal law.58
Local government liability for more ordinary torts—such as negligent
operation of a motor vehicle—is largely determined by state law. For years,
municipalities had the benefit of the same sort of immunity from suit as that

52.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
53.
Id.
54.
State officers and employees, however, may be sued under the section for
injunctive relief, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), or may be
sued in their personal capacity for damages, see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
Qualified immunity, however, may protect some of these defendants from liability.
55.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 698–99.
56.
See id.; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980); see also
Fred L. Morrison, The Liability of Governments for Legislative Acts in the United States of
America, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 541 (1998).
57.
See Acevedo-Cordero v. Cordero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20, 22–23 (1st Cir.
1992); Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1277 (6th Cir. 1988); Aitchison v.
Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 98–100 (3d Cir. 1983); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943,
952–53 (7th Cir. 1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039 (1983); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d
1345, 1349–50 (9th Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193–94
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 274–80
(4th Cir. 1980); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611–14 (8th Cir.
1980).
58.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); see also
Morrison, supra note 56, at 541.

2014]

GAME CHANGER

967

enjoyed by federal and state governments.59 But a series of legal changes in the
second half of the twentieth century—first in state courts and then state
legislatures—pulled back from this position of absolute immunity and began to
subject local governments to liability under ordinary state tort law. 60 The judicial
inroads into municipal immunity largely turned on whether the entity was engaged
in a governmental (still immune) or proprietary (not immune) function. 61 Soon
after, many states adopted statutes that largely ignored the governmentalproprietary function distinction and either waived immunity for certain kinds of
tort claims, e.g., negligent operation of a motor vehicle, or provided a blanket
waiver and then enumerated certain exceptions to immunity. 62 A few states, such
as Washington, went so far as to waive municipal immunity such that local
governments are liable “to the same extent as if they were a private person or
corporation.”63
In any case, however, local governments largely retained immunity for
the discretionary acts of their officials. 64 Similarly, those officials are still afforded
absolute or qualified immunity, depending upon their positions and authority, for
discretionary actions taken in the context of their official duties. 65 Most
importantly for our purposes (and consistent with § 1983): local elected officials
are typically entitled to absolute immunity for any actions taken in their legislative
capacity.66 This includes, for the most part, the promulgation and administration of
economic development incentives.
C. The Relationship Between Political and Market Accountability
The relationship between political and market accountability for elected
officials is far from straightforward. The Supreme Court obviously thinks, for
example, that local government liability for constitutional violations provides some
deterrent effect.67 Others, particularly Daryl Levinson, argue that local government

59.
See STEVENSON, supra note 46,
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM

§ 9.1; DANIEL MANDELKER ET AL., STATE
535 (6th ed. 2006).
See STEVENSON, supra note 46, § 9.1; MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 59, at

60.
535–41.
61.
See STEVENSON, supra note 46, § 9.1; MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 59, at
538, 544. This distinction has been widely criticized as unworkable. See, e.g., Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 488 U.S. 889 (1998); see also SANDRA M. STEVENSON &
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 32.05 (2d ed. 2008)
(discussing cases). But it continues to be used by many jurisdictions. See STEVENSON, supra
note 46, § 9.2; MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 59, at 544.
62.
See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 59, at 537–45.
63.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE. § 4.96.010 (2013).
64.
See STEVENSON, supra note 46, § 9.2.
65.
Id. § 8.6.
66.
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951); STEVENSON, supra note
46, § 8.6.
67.
See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514–15 (1994); Memphis Cmty.
Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20–21
(1980); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651–52 (1980); Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590–91 (1978).
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officials are largely indifferent to liability. 68 This indifference mostly stems from
the fact that those officials do not personally bear the costs of such liability (they
are not sued directly or, when they are, they are indemnified by the municipality)
and seldom pay for such violations at election time. 69 Voters just aren’t that
interested in such things and, in some cases, elected officials may actually reap
electoral benefits from engaging in unconstitutional behavior toward, say, political
minorities. 70 And local officials can also reach confidential settlements (with
taxpayer dollars, not their own personal monies) for any actions that may bring
unwanted attention.71 Thus, local officials are free to engage in wrongful conduct
without paying any price, personally or politically, and Levinson concludes that
this undermines the basic rationale for our system of holding governments
responsible for damages caused by their torts.72
This story of the complete disconnect between political and market
liability, however, does not quite account for many real features in the landscape
of local government.73 Local officials spend much of their time attempting to come
up with an optimal mix of taxation and resource allocation. 74 For this reason, they
may be quite politically sensitive to any type of tort liability because it decreases
the amount of resources that they have to allocate. 75 Anecdotal evidence supports
this theory, as local officials often work hard to beat lawsuits and often engage in
practices thought to diminish future exposure.76 Finally, the ubiquity of statutory
governmental immunity tells us that liability is thought—by politicians, at least—
to exact a political price.77 Elected officials, then, are not completely indifferent to
market liability. The key issue seems to be voter interest. To the extent that voters
know and care about behavior that might lead to legal action, officials will be
reticent about such behavior.

III. PROPOSAL: MARKET ACCOUNTABILITY LITE
State and local economic development decisions are business-like, so it
makes sense to hold them to business standards. While corporate boards of
directors have extremely broad discretion, they can’t do just anything they want.
Crucially, they are subject to market discipline—investors can always sell their
shares. Further, they have a legal duty of care. In the end, this amounts to a
procedural requirement that they ask the right sorts of questions and look at the
right sorts of information. State and local governments should be under similar
68.
See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 355 (2000).
69.
See id. at 355–57.
70.
See id. at 367–70. For example, aggressive policing policies may result in a
larger number of constitutional violations, yet a politician behind those policies may well
benefit from being viewed as “tough on crime.”
71.
See Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability:
Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 829 (2007).
72.
See Levinson, supra note 68, at 415–20.
73.
See Rosenthal, supra note 71, at 832–44.
74.
See id. at 832–37.
75.
See id.
76.
See id. at 831.
77.
See id. at 838–41.
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constraints. There are differences between the cases, of course. The primary
deterrent against bad decision-making by a board of directors is the ability of
shareholders to effectively “cash out” or move their investments elsewhere. Dutyof-care requirements protect shareholders from poor decisions that come “out of
the blue” and are hasty. Communities, however, don’t face much threat from their
shareholders—citizens—moving their assets, at least in the short run, because of
the large transaction costs involved. 78 Rather, the primary tool for disciplining
government officials is the ballot box. This difference, however, makes the need
for a nondivestment accountability tool all the more crucial. A procedural
requirement that officials must ask the right sorts of questions and look at the right
sort of information would strengthen political constraints on state and local
policymakers. Citizens who care about local economic development could learn
about whether their elected officials had avoided the pitfalls of offering incentives
and, if not, attempt to hold officials responsible at the polls. Even just calling
officials to their duties as good community stewards might have a salutary effect
on their decision-making.
A. The Duty of Care and Business Judgment Rule in Corporate Law
Business corporations, like their municipal counterparts, are
organizational structures intended to facilitate certain types of cooperative
activity.79 The corporation itself is a legal structure designed to allocate rights and
duties among groups of people devoted to a shared commercial enterprise. 80 The
group itself is quite diverse, and may be said to include directors, officers,
shareholders, employees, bondholders, suppliers, and even customers. 81
Although there are a number of features considered crucial to the legal
definition of a corporation, the keys to its decision-making structure are shared
ownership by investors and delegated management. 82 The three key players in this
structure are the shareholders, the board of directors, and the officers. The
shareholders, often referred to as the “owners” of the firm, have the right to receive
residual profits (the portion that remains after all obligations have been satisfied).
Shareholders have the right to elect the board of directors. The directors are, in
turn, the locus of authority within the corporation—they represent the firm when
human counterparts to the fictional form are required. 83 But the board of directors

78.
See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditure, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956) (arguing that regional fragmentation promotes intermunicipal competition
and provides options for highly mobile consumer–voters).
79.
See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote, and the
False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 464 (2008)
[hereinafter Hayden & Bodie, One Share One Vote].
80.
See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the
Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2077–78 (2010)
[hereinafter Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder Democracy].
81.
Id. at 2078.
82.
For a short description of the basic structure of a corporation, see Hayden &
Bodie, One Share One Vote, supra note 79, at 465; Hayden & Bodie, Shareholder
Democracy, supra note 80, at 2078–79.
83.
See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 21 (1986).
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does not run the day-to-day affairs of the business—it delegates that power to the
officers. The officers can, in turn, hire employees. The entire structure is
hierarchical, in that shareholders can vote out directors, directors can fire officers,
and officers can fire the other employees. 84
As the principal holders of the residual profits, the shareholders are
thought to be in the best position to ensure the overall health of the corporation.
For that reason, they alone have the power to elect and remove directors. 85 And
while this power is exercised in the midst of the most market-oriented situation
imaginable, it is, essentially, a political accountability mechanism. It is not,
however, a particularly powerful one. This is because corporate governance
structures are much less responsive than their political counterparts.
One would think that if corporate directors were acting out of self-interest
or otherwise making poor decisions, the shareholders could simply elect a different
set of candidates. But, despite the fact that shareholders generally vote every year
for many or all of the directors, there are a number of features of corporate
elections that blunt the ability of shareholders to replace existing directors. 86 In
most corporate elections, the board puts forth its proposed slate of candidates (who
may all be incumbents), and the shareholders merely ratify those choices. 87 Those
nominated are subject to a simple up or down vote, and, since there is typically no
majority requirement, a director may, in theory, be retained so long as she receives
only one vote.88 Shareholders may, in theory, propose their own candidates, but
they face much higher costs in nominating candidates than do the incumbent board
members. Candidates outside the official proxy process must create their own
ballots and distribute them to the shareholders.89 There is no standard ballot, so
“outside” candidates must provide their own proxies and ensure compliance with
federal securities regulations. 90 “These substantial costs mean that most
shareholders never nominate candidates, even if those candidates would be
superior directors.”91 This is part of the basic paradigm of modern corporate law:
the separation of ownership from control, shareholders from managers. 92 And it
84.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 555–58 (2003) (detailing the hierarchical
nature of a corporation); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 79, at 465.
85.
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 35–39 (1991); Hayden & Bodie, One Share One Vote,
supra note 79, at 472–74.
86.
See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics
of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 126–28 (2012) (describing several
features of corporate elections that blunt shareholders’ ability to replace existing directors)
[hereinafter Hayden & Bodie, Bizarre Law and Economics].
87.
See id; Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the
Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217, 1242 (2009) [hereinafter Hayden
& Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem].
88.
See Hayden & Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem, supra note 87, at 1240.
89.
See Hayden & Bodie, Bizarre Law and Economics, supra note 86, at 126.
90.
See id.
91.
See id. at 127.
92.
See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932).
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means that corporate board elections, despite the democratic window dressing, are
not actually effective mechanisms of political accountability.
There are, however, more market-oriented checks upon corporate
directors. Capital mobility is a barrier to board misconduct. If a firm makes bad
choices, shareholders can (and will) sell their stock and do something else with the
money.93 In addition to shareholders’ reaction, the directors of most corporations
have, by law, certain fiduciary duties to the corporation, including a duty of loyalty
and duty of care. The duty of loyalty is essentially a conflict of interest rule, and
requires that directors put the interests of the corporation above their own personal
interests. 94 The duty of care is a broader requirement that demands that they
exercise good business judgment and use ordinary care and prudence in the
operation of the business.95 Application of the duty of care, however, is limited by
the business judgment rule, which keeps courts from second-guessing a board’s
substantive business decisions.96 Instead, a court will only consider the quality of
the board’s decision-making procedures, not the actual decisions themselves. 97
Breach of these duties may, in theory at least, subject a director to personal
liability for damages.98
For many years, the corporate duty of care was thought to provide no real
constraint on board decision-making at all. This is because courts had construed
the business judgment rule quite expansively, effectively giving boards free reign
with regard to their decision-making. 99 That all changed, however, when the
Delaware Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Smith v. Van Gorkom.100 In that
case, a minority shareholder of Trans Union claimed that the board had breached
its duty of care by approving a merger in which the shareholders would receive a
certain price for their shares (at a premium over the market price). 101 To the

93.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting
Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 619 (2006).
94.
See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693,
751 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The classic example that implicates the duty of loyalty is when a
fiduciary either appears on both sides of a transaction or receives a personal benefit not
shared by all shareholders.”).
95.
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985)
(describing it in part as “a director’s duty to exercise an informed business judgment”).
96.
See id. at 872.
97.
See id.
98.
We say “in theory” because there are, practically, many reasons why
directors may never actually pay damages in such a case. First, in response to the Van
Gorkom decision, many states, including Delaware, amended their general corporation laws
to allow corporations to adopt charter provisions that eliminate director liability. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991); Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van
Gorkom’s Legacy: The Limits of Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of
Proprietary Incentives, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 583 (2002). Although most corporations
have availed themselves of this provision, the case has still had a significant effect upon
board behavior. See Elson & Thompson, supra, at 583–84.
99.
See Daniel Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case,
40 BUS. LAW 1437, 1444 (1985).
100.
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
101.
See id.
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surprise of many, the court agreed. 102 But, perhaps even more surprisingly, the
court did not quibble with the substance of the board’s decision, but instead found
that it had breached its duty by making the decision too quickly, without the right
information, and without asking the right questions. 103 The failing was procedural,
not substantive.
The Delaware legislature quickly enacted a statute that largely mooted the
effect of Van Gorkom.104 The statute allows corporations to include provisions in
their foundational documents that remove director liability for damages for breach
of the duty of care in the absence of disloyalty or bad faith. 105 Many other states,
following Delaware’s lead, have passed their own versions of the statute.106 And
most corporations have made use of the option to limit director liability. 107 Thus, if
directors today did what the Trans Union directors did, they would not be subject
to liability for damages.
But despite these statutory “corrections” of the Van Gorkom approach,
most observers agree that the decision prompted tremendous changes in the way
that corporate boards conduct their business. 108 This may be because boards are
still subject to injunctive relief that would put a hold on transactions that are found
to have breached the duty of care. 109 In any case, most corporate boards now
incorporate a broad range of procedural safeguards into their decision-making
processes, from the use of expert consultants on corporate transactions to, more
generally, the longer meetings and greater documentation that accompanies other
board decisions.110
Corporate law scholars have roundly condemned the Van Gorkom version
of the business judgment rule.111 Some focus on the fact that the new regime does
nothing to deter a board from making poor, or even terrible, substantive
decisions—the focus is entirely procedural. 112 Others point to the costs of
compliance with the new procedural regime. Longer formal meetings, greater
recordkeeping, and the greater use of outside consultants have increased the cost of
board decision-making. 113 The duty of care, then, appears to have led to the
adoption of a number of formalities without providing any check on whether the
resulting decisions are any better than they used to be—form for form’s sake.114
102.
See id.
103.
See id.
104.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
105.
See id.
106.
See Elson & Thompson, supra note 98, at 583.
107.
See id.
108.
See id. at 582–87; Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and
Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkam and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U.L.
REV. 675, 676 (2002) (“The result, critics charge, is unnecessary delay and expense that
ultimately harms the firm and its shareholders.”).
109.
See Elson & Thompson, supra note 98, at 584–85.
110.
See id.; Stout, supra note 108, at 676.
111.
See Stout, supra note 108, at 676, 690–91.
112.
See id. at 676.
113.
See id.
114.
See id.
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These criticisms, as well as others, have led scholars such as Daniel Fischel to
deem Van Gorkom “one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law.”115
But the Van Gorkom opinion is only a failure if the changes that it forced
in the boardroom give rise to more costs than benefits. The argument is essentially
that, without any sanction for substantively bad decisions, board members have
little added incentive to make good ones. But, as Lynn Stout points out, this only
makes sense if you believe that there’s no connection between better procedures
and better decisions, and this is far from obvious. 116 In fact, all things being equal,
we usually believe that more carefully considered, well-informed decisions are
likely to be better decisions.117
Stout believes that this is especially true in the corporate boardroom.
Without the Van Gorkom tweaks to the business judgment rule, directors were, of
course, free to ask for more time or more information before making a decision.
They could, in her way of conceiving of the issue, act more altruistically, looking
out for the good of the firm.118 But whether people act altruistically often depends
upon the social context.119 Specifically, people are more likely to do so when the
personal cost and sacrifice of doing so is not that high. 120 The Van Gorkom
decision reduces the personal cost of asking for more time and information.
Individual directors do not need to ask for the information—much of it, thanks to
the new rule, is provided as a matter of course. 121 This also reduces the personal
social cost that attends confronting firm officers with respect to their
recommended courses of action.122 Thus, Stout concludes, the duty of care “may
play an important role in promoting director diligence by helping to create a social
framework that supports altruistic behavior.”123
B. Proposal: A Duty of Care for Local Governments
Explicit attempts by local governments to promote community prosperity
by negotiating arrangements with private firms should be subject to a duty of care.
Such a duty would require local officials to exercise good business judgment and
use ordinary care and prudence in the pursuit of economic development. Citizens
of a locality should be able to file suit to enforce that duty.
Making governments liable to citizen lawsuits is, no doubt, a dangerous
thing. Having courts second-guess every decision that some citizen doesn’t agree
with would be a disaster. 124 Decision-making at the state and local level would

115.
Fischel, supra note 99, at 1455.
116.
See Stout, supra note 108, at 676–77.
117.
See id.; see also Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial
Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1927 (2011).
118.
See Stout, supra note 108, at 677–78, 683–92.
119.
See id. at 683–87.
120.
See id. at 687.
121.
See id. at 688.
122.
See id. at 688–89.
123.
Id. at 687.
124.
This concern might suggest that a legislative solution to the problem posed
by economic incentives might be preferable. While this idea certainly has merit, we see two
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become incredibly costly, making governance extremely difficult. That is certainly
not the point of this proposal. In addition to excluding nonbusiness decisions from
the duty of care, it is important that the substantive decisions of local governing
bodies be shielded from review. It is crucial, then, to have a local government
version of the business judgment rule in place. Courts should not make economic
development policy but merely ensure that policymakers collect information
relevant to the possible pitfalls of offering incentives and to reserve time to attend
to it.
There are two mechanisms by which problems might be avoided by
recognizing a procedural duty of care for local governments engaged in offering
local economic development incentives. The first is that such a course would
strengthen political accountability mechanisms. Incentive offers rarely achieve
their desired goals. Further, they involve important opportunity costs—effort and
resources might be better spent, even from the perspective of enhancing local
prosperity. These costs are largely unrecognized and so often go unaddressed. A
procedural requirement to confront the potential pitfalls of incentives would leave
officials free to go ahead with incentives programs, regardless of what their
investigations revealed, but the real issues involved would be made available to
everyone. Citizens would then be in a position to judge whether the particular
incentives policy is what they want. Even a weak, merely procedural duty of care
would greatly enhance political accountability, the primary mechanism for
providing oversight of local officials. There is evidence that even under existing
conditions of inadequate information, greater public participation tends to decrease
the use of incentives policies that are perceived to be costly. 125
The second mechanism by which a duty of care might help ameliorate the
problems associated with offering local economic development incentives is
psychological. Our analysis of the role played by local officials does not impute to
them pernicious motives. Incentives do have some intuitive appeal; at present,
there is no structural reason why officials should look into things any further.
When an incentives package is proposed by sympathetic community members it is,
as we saw before, natural for policymakers to get “on board.”126 Elected officials,
drawbacks. The first is motivational. Legislative solutions require community majorities to
recognize that there is a problem first, and, as we noted at the end of Part I, there is
relatively stable low-information equilibrium right now. The literature on legislative
attempts to spread information about incentives does not make the legislative path look
promising. According to the Pew Center on the States, only four of the “leaders” in this area
look at all state-level incentives packages and only 10 “leaders” have actually performed
even a single high quality evaluation of an incentives offer (and only one state—Oregon—
has done both). PEW CTR., supra note 31. Full information about incentives is unlikely to
come from governments without further pressure. One benefit of our proposal is that it
allows a minority of citizens to request information without allowing them control over the
political process. The second drawback is competitive. State and local officials are loathe to
“unilaterally disarm” when it comes to the ability to make incentives offers because they are
afraid of the effect it will have on perceptions of business climate. See Ellis & Rogers,
supra note 26. Again, minority pressure may be the key to disseminating information about
incentives.
125.
See Wolman & Spitzley, supra note 22.
126.
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 23.
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in particular, are likely to focus in on the purported benefits of the plan.127 This, in
turn, leads to overconfidence in the rosy scenario that has been sketched. 128 And
that increases the likelihood that decision-makers will commit the planning
fallacy—a tendency to underestimate the costs of a course of action, in terms of
time, resources, and effort, while overestimating the benefits. 129 In effect, planning
can lead people to focus on the best-case scenario, not the most likely scenario.
Given all of this, by the time regular citizens get wind of particular projects,
policymakers are likely to resist those urging caution. A duty of care that
emphasizes procedural rules could short-circuit the foregoing problems. Requiring
the decision process to confront potential opposing viewpoints can temper
overconfidence. Data-oriented “push-back” from citizens could play the role of a
premortem for a project. Conducting a premortem is a decision strategy whereby a
group assumes that a proposal has failed and tries to figure out what
“happened.”130 The idea is to determine pitfalls that might impede a program in
order to avoid them. There is evidence that conducting a premortem mitigates (but
does not eliminate) overconfidence.131 In particular, a procedural requirement that
invites a decision-maker to expand the range of considerations she takes into
account can “nudge” her toward actually thinking about those things.132

CONCLUSION
In this Article, we present a procedural mechanism to counter the pitfalls
associated with the practice of offering economic development incentives.
Improving the process is important for state and local government fiscal and
economic health given the extensive use and enormous value of incentives that are
offered. At a minimum these incentives divert funds from other potential
investments and from spending on desired local public infrastructure. At best, they
serve as risky investments, which, under propitious conditions, have positive net
payoffs to communities.
Government officials are woefully ill-equipped to evaluate the costs and
benefits of incentives deals so as to make the sort of offers that avoid negative
outcomes (the “winner’s curse”). Indeed, a growing body of academic research
shows that state and local governments are often on the losing end of these
agreements. But this research alone will not prompt a change in the situation. For a
variety of reasons—both decision theoretic and psychological—government
officials are in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis their business counterparts. As
a result, they do not seek out the kind of information that would allow them to
avoid subsidizing the wrong firms, to recognize the kinds of circumstances that
may lead to bidding wars for the right ones, or to fully account for the costs and
benefits of a project. Without changing the incentives structure, there is little
reason to expect any change in this situation.
127.
See Brenner et al., supra note 25.
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131.
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See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 69–70 (discussing the
psychological phenomena of “priming”).
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We draw from the procedures used in corporate organizations regarding
shareholders’ rights. In the corporate setting, the board of directors is subject to a
legal duty of care, which imposes a procedural requirement that it asks the right
sorts of questions and considers the right sorts of information when making
decisions. Even when tempered by the business judgment rule, this weak notion of
accountability is argued to improve decision-making by establishing a process by
which there is pressure to gather and discuss information that is relevant for the
decision at hand. The application of duty-of-care requirements to state and local
governments seems straightforward in the case of offering economic development
incentives, which are explicit attempts by those governments to promote
community prosperity via special arrangements with private firms. In this scenario,
citizens are the direct benefactors of such dealings. Like shareholders, citizens
have a right to a duty of care when decisions are being made on their behalf. The
symmetry of the citizen-elected official and shareholder-elected board of directors
relationship is apparent. Like the corporate environment, providing for a
procedural duty of care can improve public decision-making.

